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Rescuing failing banks for financial stability: The unintended outcomes of bail-in rules 
By Andrea Miglionico 
 
Abstract 
The regulatory architecture of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) introduced rules necessary to prevent financial instability and systemic risk 
contagion. However the restructuring tools for failing banks, namely bail-in, precautionary recapitalisation 
and resolving plans are largely flexible to allow Member States to adopt domestic policy measures to rescue 
distressed institutions. This leaves broad discretion to national competent authorities to provide public financial 
support, a legacy of the bail-out programmes that can undermine the new EU bank insolvency regime. 
 
1. Introduction 
The EU Banking Union with its articulated system of supervisory powers to the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the innovative tools given by regulators to Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) and Bank Recovery and Resolution directive (BRRD)1 constitutes the new regulatory 
framework of bank insolvency regime.2 The SRM is structured into a centralized resolution 
authority (Single Resolution Board) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund which provides mutualized 
private financing of bank resolution tools. In terms of supervision, the ‘Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’ (SSM) put the ECB directly in charge as the supervisor for the largest Eurozone 
banking institutions.3 The ECB also has the right to oversight smaller Eurozone banks that it does 
not supervise directly: in substance, the ECB is the direct supervisor of the large cross-border banks 
                                                 
 Dr. Andrea Miglionico is a Lecturer in Banking and Finance Law, University of Reading, School of Law. E-mail: 
a.miglionico@reading.ac.uk 
 
1 EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014. These resolution tools require the establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of 
credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) 
No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 173 of 12 June 2014, p. 
190. 
2 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has been established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 
October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions, OJ L 287 of 29 October 2013, p. 63. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has 
been introduced by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms 
in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, OJ L 225 of 30 July 2014, p. 1. 
3 The SSM is composed of the ECB and the national competent authorities, with the ECB in charge of its effective and 
consistent functioning (Article 6.1). The scope of application of the SSM Regulation comprises all Euro area Member 
States on a compulsory basis and also non-euro area Member States that voluntarily enter into a ‘close cooperation’ 
with the ECB (Article 7). The SSM Regulation confers ‘specific tasks’ related to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions to the ECB. See Commission release Statement/14/77, 20 March 2014. 
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for the entire Eurozone banking system.4  
Bail-in is a key resolution instrument in the BRRD and in the SRM: the rationale is to provide a 
mechanism to return an insufficiently solvent bank to ‘balance sheet stability’ at the expense of 
some of its creditors without the necessity for external capital injection. Along the bail-in 
mechanism, the BRRD provides the precautionary recapitalisation for ‘non-insolvent banks’ that 
experience distressed scenario. Recapitalisation could preserve financial stability—as a remedy to 
cover losses for failing banks—in the case of a rescue plan with strict conditionally guaranteed by a 
pool of investment banks. Recapitalisation aims to give the bank a new positive outlook for 
profitability with the injection of new capital although it can be interpreted as a sort of temporary 
public financial assistance.5 If the equity capital increase fails, the failing bank could need to resort 
to State aid, which in turn would likely result in the write-down or conversion of the bank’s 
subordinated debt. The recent episodes of bank failures (Venetian banks, Banco Popular Español 
S.A., Banco Espírito Santo and Pireus Bank) are cases in point to demonstrate the applicability of 
bail-in rules to protect national interests. On this view, Avgouleas and Goodhart argue that the ‘bail-
in regimes will fail to eradicate the need for an injection of public funds where there is a threat of 
systemic collapse, because a number of banks have simultaneously entered into difficulties, or in 
the event of the failure of a large complex cross-border bank, except in those cases where failure 
was clearly idiosyncratic’.6 Since the BRRD leaves broad discretion to national authorities to adopt 
domestic policy measures to rescue failing banks, it is difficult to clear up the legacy of bail-out 
intervention.  
This article argues that the new regulatory architecture for failing banks raises doubt about the 
effectiveness of restructuring tools introduced in the EU bank insolvency regime. The provisions on 
bail-in and precautionary recapitalisation show how credit institutions rely on national supervision 
and public financial support. As Donnelly noted, ‘Banking Union still relies significantly on 
national rather than European administrative and financial resources to ensure local financial 
stability, so that resilience remains asymmetric’.7 It can be observed that an international insolvency 
regime should address fruitfully these issues establishing a common regulatory toolkit resulting 
                                                 
4 Eilís Ferran and Valia Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2013) 13(2) Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, 255. The authors note that ‘designing the SSM has been an exercise in sophisticated legal gymnastics to fit 
within the existing Treaty framework, as well as high stakes political manoeuvring and pragmatic decision-making’.  
5 Communication on the recapitalization of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the 
minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (Recapitalization Communication) OJ C 
10, 15.1.2009. 
6 E. Avgouleas and C. A Goodhart, ‘A Critical Evaluation of Bail-in as a Bank Recapitalisation Mechanism’, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 10065, July 2014, 19-21. 
7 Shawn Donnelly, ‘Liberal economic nationalism, financial stability, and Commission leniency in Banking Union’ 
(2017) 21(2) Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 170. 
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from the different models.8 The next section discusses the BRRD regime and the role of the SRM 
for distressed banks: the resolution tools, i.e. bail-in and precautionary recapitalisation are 
addressed in light of the recourse to public financial support. Section three considers the case of 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) in relation to the recapitalisation issue. Section four 
examines the impact of non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank restructuring and provides an 
analysis of the regulatory developments on non-performing exposures (NPEs). On this view, section 
five underlines the quest for public interest in rescuing distressed credit institutions as the EU 
regulators allow Member States to adopt taxpayers funded bailout and State aid measures. This 
undermines the effectiveness of banking union framework and it can be seen as a circumvention of 
bail-in rules. The last section concludes. 
 
2. The BRRD and the SRM regime for distressed banks 
The BRRD and the SRM introduced a considerable set of resolution tools for application in all 
Member States and significantly reinforced the regime for cross-border cooperation within the EU.9 
The ECB is the competent authority responsible for supervising failing banks and works in 
relationship with other authorities, namely the European Commission and national central banks. 
The BRRD and SRM for Eurozone banks provide a regulatory framework for the resolution of 
banks that requires senior creditors to participate in losses, if necessary, instead of or ahead of a 
bank receiving sovereign support.10 As a rule, group resolution efforts are to be coordinated by the 
consolidated group-level resolution authority, with only limited scope for independent resolution 
action by national resolution authorities for individual group companies.11 
The BRRD contains legal provisions on loss absorbency in the form of bail-in of shareholders, 
creditors and, if necessary, depositors not protected by law (deposits more than €100,000) up to a 
maximum of eight percent of the institution’s total assets, which in the past would have covered all 
eventualities.12 The resolution authorities can decide to sell the bank as a going concern, create a 
bridge institution, hive off assets, bail-in creditors and adopt precautionary recapitalisation in a form 
                                                 
8 Matthias Lehmann, ‘Bail-In and Private International Law: How to Make Bank Resolution Measures Effective Across 
Borders’ (2017) 66(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 108. 
9 See BRRD, Titles V (on “Cross-border Group Resolution” within the EU) and VI (on “Relations with Third 
Countries”). 
10 It is important to note that covered bonds are exempt from bail-in under BRRD and may benefit from resolution tools. 
11 Jens-Hinrich Binder, ‘To Ring-Fence or Not, and How? Strategic Questions for Post-Crisis Banking Reform in 
Europe’ (December 2014) available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2543860. See generally BRRD, articles 87 (general 
principles), 88 (resolution colleges), 91 and 92 (procedural and substantive requirements for resolution action in relation 
to groups). On the conditions for independent action by host authorities in this context, see articles 91(8) and 92(4). 
12 Ioannis Kokkoris and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Resolution of Banks and the State Aid Regime’ in Jens-Hinrich 
Binder and Dalvinder Singh (eds.), Bank Resolution: The European Regime (OUP: Oxford University Press 2016) 304-
305. 
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of private bail-in or recourse to public support in a form of State aid. In addition, all member States 
must set up national resolution funds with resources which after ten years must amount to one 
percent of insured deposits.13 The BRRD regulates recovery and resolution plans: institutions need 
to draw up and update recovery plans to (1) assess potential vulnerabilities; and (2) prepare 
measures to restore their financial position in case of “significant deterioration” of financial 
position. Recovery plans are based on various scenario including both idiosyncratic problems and 
market-wide stress (e.g. normal and adverse stress scenario), and they are assessed by competent 
supervisory authorities, which may require amendments to remedy “material deficiencies”. The 
BRRD and the SRM Regulation set the resolution planning: competent resolution authorities need 
to draft and update “resolution plans” to prepare swift and effective resolution action in case 
“conditions for resolution” under BRRD are met.  
The SSM and the SRM, within their respective mandates should be able to efficiently deal with 
the proliferation of cross-border banking and any possible negative implications. However, the EU 
mechanism for resolving failing banks is still work in progress and needs to be fully tested. State 
level deposit insurers are not viable inside a monetary union because the liquidation of small banks 
could overwhelm the capacity of national deposit insurance. Mutualisation of deposit insurance 
requires full harmonisation of insolvency laws because the effectiveness of the bank liquidation 
process will have an impact on the financial situation of the deposit insurance over which insured 
depositors have a legal claim. Nieto and Wall observed that ‘given that the barriers to cross-border 
banking are likely to fall, the EU should consider what sort of banking structure would provide the 
best combination of an integrated financial system and a financial system in which the banks are 
neither too large to supervise nor too large to safely fail’.14 On this view, rules will have impact on 
where banks shed operations due to cost factors of maintaining operations and risk will likely 
migrate to less regulated local entities in a risk race to bottom.  
Since the key objective of the BRRD is to favour private sector loss absorbency for failing 
banks through a mechanism of eligible liabilities (MREL system)15, resolution authorities maintain 
discretion to adopt alternative measures for recapitalising banks in crisis. Recently, the BRRD has 
been under criticism for lack of harmonised regimes in the application of bail-in tools: a proposal to 
amend the existing rules has been advanced to strengthen the harmonisation process of national 
bank insolvency procedures in order to facilitate orderly intervention and uniformity of regulatory 
                                                 
13 John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh, ‘The EU bank recovery and resolution 
directive—Some observations on the financing arrangements’ (2014) 15(3/4) Journal of Banking Regulation, 218-226.  
14 Maria Nieto and Larry D. Wall, ‘Cross-Border Banking on the Two Sides of the Atlantic: Does it Have an Impact on 
Bank Crisis Management?’, FRB Atlanta Working Paper No. 2015-11, 21. 
15 According to the BRRD all banks are required to meet a Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible 
Liabilities (MREL) to ensure that sufficient financial resources are available for write-down or conversion into equity.   
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treatment.16 The proposal aims to create a minimum level playing field for banks and to foster 
prudential treatment of NPLs: the banks should be incentivised to deal with NPLs at an early stage 
to avoid the origination of high volume of non-performing assets.  
 
3. The precautionary recapitalisation of failing banks 
The controversial rescue plan of MPS highlighted the deficiencies of the Italian banking sector 
in preventing failures and intervening timely to address the disruptions of distressed credit 
institution.17 MPS started to deal with the non-performing exposures (NPE) after the results of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) EU-wide stress test of 201618 that showed for MPS a strong 
reduction of its CET1.19 However the difficulties of the Italian bank are legacy of the past as the 
first aids and relative restructuring plan evidenced the weaknesses in the corporate governance 
structure and showed the limits to restore a long-term profitability.20  
The precautionary recapitalisation of MPS through a special insolvency procedure under Italian 
law raised concerns on the credibility of bail-in rules.21 The provision of a guarantee by the Italian 
government technically amounts to a preferential treatment granted to MPS senior bondholders, 
despite that it is contingent and might never materialise (contingent State aid as there is a contingent 
burden on state resources).22 The fact that the provision of the guarantee by the government is 
required for the transaction to occur will be carried under commercial markets conditions (i.e. a fee 
in exchange of a service that rather than being provided by a market participant will be provided by 
                                                 
16 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy, 
Brussels, 23 November 2016, COM(2016) 853 final; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 
2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 2007/36/EC, Brussels, 23 November 2016, 
COM(2016) 852 final. 
17 Benoit Mesnard, Marcel Magnus and Alienor Anne Claire Duvillet-Margerit, ‘The precautionary recapitalisation of 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena’, European Parliament Briefing, 6 July 2017, 3. 
18 The stress test does not have a threshold for success/failure, but is designed as an informative element relevant for the 
supervision process. The results will then be used by the competent authorities to assess the capacity of the bank to meet 
the regulatory requirements in stressed scenarios on the basis of common methodologies and assumptions. 
19 It indicates the bank’s core equity capital compared with its total risk-weighted assets that are used to quantify a 
bank’s financial strength. 
20 Following the acquisition of Banca Antonveneta for €9 billion from Banco Santander, BMPS reported €5.5 billion of 
impairments in the balance sheet of 2011 and 2012. See European Commission, ‘State aid n° SA. 36175 (2013/N) – 
Italy MPS – Restructuring’, C(2013) 8427 final, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/249091/249091_1518538_162_2.pdf. 
21 European Commission, ‘State aid: Commission authorises precautionary recapitalisation of Italian bank Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena’, Press Release, Brussels, 4 July 2017, 2. See also Monte dei Paschi di Siena, ‘BMPS: European 
commission approves the 2017-20121 restructuring plan’, Press Release, available at:  
http://english.mps.it/media-and-news/press-releases/2017/Pages/press_release_20170705.aspx. 
22 Bank of Italy, ‘The ‘precautionary recapitalization’ of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena’, available at: 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/approfondimenti/2016/ricapitalizzazione-
mps/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1. 
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the State acting in its commercial capacity) is something that the European Commission did not 
qualify as State aid.23 Moreover, in the aftermath of the overhaul of the EU resolution regime, it is 
expected to favour bail-in. Therefore, the case of MPS can be seen as one where there is an attempt 
to avoid the unavoidable and might constitute an abuse of State aid framework. As a result, it is 
difficult to understand the policy of the Commission as the main objective of the BRRD is to ensure 
that insolvent banks can be resolved in an orderly and uniform manner without generating financial 
instability (and minimising the use of State aid).24 
The recourse to financial assistance increased the reliance to aids and undermined the BRRD 
rules. This means that precautionary recapitalisation under the BRRD deliberately has been left as 
loopholes for cases where bail-ins cannot work. The liquidation of Venetian banks (Veneto Banca 
and Banca Popolare di Vicenza) demonstrates the willingness to avoid bail-in and seek public 
support.25 These two banks were considered by the ECB ‘failing or likely to fail’ a condition to 
access the resolution or liquidation tools in which State aid was the restructuring option. The 
winding-up of Veneto banks seems an exception to the aid regime and constitutes a precedent for 
manoeuvre from Member States. However the decision on the bank’s critical functions and 
potential adverse effects into the market is a matter of the Single Resolution Board. In the case of 
Venetian banks the justification for the state aid originated from the government’s own assessment 
of local effects of liquidation. On this point, it has been noted that ‘in the absence of clarity on what 
constitutes a serious impact on the regional economy, the rules on liquidation aid leave room for 
governments to effectively re-instate at the local level the public interest that the SRB has denied at 
national (or, in the Italian case, even at the regional) level’.26 The SRB is the authority in charge of 
the assessment of public interest although the criteria for assessing a failing bank through resolution 
actions or national insolvency proceedings are still far from clear. In addition, the assessment 
whether a bank is non-insolvent and ‘failing or likely to fail’ leaves discretion to the EU regulators 
(i.e. ECB and SRB) as inconsistent decisions have been taken for distressed credit institutions. In 
this context, Tröger argued that ‘the bail-in tool under the BRRD and the SRM-Reg provides for a 
highly complicated and detailed regulatory framework that gives a multitude of authorities ample 
                                                 
23 Gert Jan Koopman, ‘Market based solutions to bank restructuring and the role of State Aid Control: the case of 
NPLs’, speech delivered at the ECMI Annual Conference, Brussels, 9 November 2016, available at: 
http://www.eurocapitalmarkets.org/system/files/Gert%20Jan%20Koopman_Speech.pdf. (at 11-12). 
24 Karel Lannoo, ‘Bank State Aid under BRRD and SRM’ (2014) 13(4) European State Aid Law Quarterly, 630-632. It 
is noted that ‘Member States can also provide extraordinary public financial support through additional financial 
stabilisation tools, such as equity support and temporary public ownership, but again as a last resort, after all other 
measures have been exploited, and following State aid rules’. 
25 Benoit Mesnard, Alienor Margerit and Marcel Magnus, ‘The orderly liquidation of Veneto Banca  and Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza’, European Parliament, 25 July 2017, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/602094/IPOL_BRI%282017%29602094_EN.pdf. 
26 Silvia Merler, ‘Bank liquidation in the European Union: clarification needed’, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue No 
1, January 2018, 11, available at http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PC-01_2018.pdf.  
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discretion in compelling private sector involvement and requires significant inter-agency 
cooperation and information sharing’.27 
In the case of Banco Popular, the SRB considered the institution ‘failing or likely to fail’ subject 
to resolution scheme for the public interest.28 Banco Popular was resolved by transferring all shares 
and capital instruments to Banco Santander S.A with no involvement of State aid. In substance, 
Banco Popular was resolved through the sale of assets and the bail-in tools.29 Since the BRRD does 
not provide a definition of “public interest” there is risk of lack of consistency and different 
regulatory treatment in resolving banks in crisis.30 This raises concerns on the effectiveness of EU 
rules since wide powers are granted to supervisory authorities in evaluating the financial conditions 
of failing banks. The question lies in the divergent assessment of investors in terms of equity and 
subordinated debt as it is undefined the trigger for haircuts.31 In the same vein, ‘it is really up to the 
SRB to decide whether the risks and the resolvability are acceptable’.32 This approach confirms that 
the bank insolvency regime remains subordinated to the State aid: a scenario that incentivises 
domestic biases in favor of protecting national champions or other banks whose failure would cause 
political problems domestically.  
 
4. The impact of NPLs on bank restructuring 
The case of MPS underlines the problem to get rid of NPLs from bank balance sheet.33 High 
percentages of NPLs reduce profitability, increase funding costs and tie up bank capital, which 
negatively impact credit supply and ultimately growth.34 Addressing the rise of NPLs has become a 
key challenge for the EU banking system and the resolution of NPLs requires comprehensive action 
to deal with these types of bad loans sitting on banks’ books.35 The main problem is the lack of a 
harmonised framework to estimate the obligors’ ability to repay and whether it has deteriorated.  
                                                 
27 Tobias H. Tröger, ‘Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Regime’ (2018) 4(1) Journal of Financial Regulation, 38. 
28 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1246 of 7 June 2017 endorsing the resolution scheme for Banco Popular Español 
S.A., C(2017) 4038. The resolution of Spanish bank can be regarded as private bail-in capital without intervention of 
the state. 
29 Benoit Mesnard, Alienor Margerit and Marcel Magnus, ‘The resolution of Banco Popular’, European Parliament, 28 
August 2017, 3. 
30 David Mayes, ‘Banking union: the problem of untried systems’ (2017) 20 Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 9. 
31 Robert Smith, ‘Banco Popular serves as a harsh lesson for coco debt holders’ Financial Times, 8 June 2018.  
32 David Mayes, ‘Banking union: the disadvantages of opportunism’ (2017) 21(2) Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 
139. 
33 Christopher Gandrud and Mark Hallerberg, ‘How not to create zombie banks: lessons for Italy from Japan’ (2017) 6 
Bruegel Policy Contribution, 7, available at: http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PC-06-2017-030317.pdf. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
35 David Bholat et al., ‘Non-performing loans: regulatory and accounting treatment of assets’, Bank of England Staff 
Working Paper No. 594, April 2016, 3.  
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In March 2017 the ECB produced a qualitative guidance on NPLs, including consideration of how 
the ‘unlikely to pay’ criterion should be applied in practice, and how banks should manage and 
monitor forbearance, write offs and collateral valuation.36 This supervisory toolkit aims to address the 
issue of identification and allocation of deteriorated loans in the EU banking sector.37 As indicated in 
the guidance, ‘the key objective of granting forbearance measures is to pave the way for 
nonperforming borrowers to exit their non-performing status, or to prevent performing borrowers 
from reaching a non-performing status’.38 The guidance aims to harmonise private mechanisms to 
resolve troubled banks through the mandatory implementation of the NPL guidance into the complex 
system of banking resolution.39 The NPL guidance has been further developed in the prudential 
treatment for distressed loans through supervisory expectations on the classification of NPEs.40 The 
ECB’s supervisory expectations supplement the NPL guidance by specifying the regulatory actions 
when assessing a bank’s levels of prudential provisions for NPEs.41 The ECB guidance should 
facilitate private restructuring mechanisms of NPLs – i.e. private workouts – and should enhance out-
of-court collateral enforcement. On this view, the Commission’s proposal aims to introduce minimum 
loss coverage for nonperforming exposures and establish secondary market to sell NPLs can be 
considered a welcome approach.42  
However the issue of regulating NPLs raises the question of identifying viable tools to restructure 
NPLs: in this context various proposals have been suggested, namely individual bank restructurings, 
bank-internal bad-bank units and bank-specific asset management companies (AMCs).43 Enria argued 
to establish an AMC with government support to resolve NPLs selling the assets at their economic 
                                                 
36 ECB, ‘Guidance to banks on non-performing loans’ (2017), 49-50, available at 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/guidance_on_npl.en.pdf. 
37 It can be noted that in the south of the European Continent, the European Bank Coordination ‘Vienna Initiative’—a 
private-public sector forum which brings together international financial institutions, international organizations, public 
authorities and private banks—has launched various proposals to address NPLs in CESEE countries. The main purpose 
is to create a platform of coordination and cooperation for Western banks to enhance enforcement measures, improving 
consistency in the definition of NPLs and removing legal obstacles and execution issues in distressed transactions. 
Specifically, the ‘Vienna Initiative’ has adopted a set of principles for monitoring and preventing the deterioration of 
assets.  
38 ECB (note 36) 39. 
39 However, the guidelines are soft law recommendations—not binding and not enforceable—and leave discretion to 
national authorities to implement them at the domestic level. 
40 ECB, ‘Addendum to the ECB Guidance to banks on nonperforming loans: Prudential provisioning backstop for non-
performing exposures’ (2018), 2,  
available at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.npl_addendum_201803.en.pdf. 
41 The ECB will assess banks’ practices and report any divergences with the prudential provisioning expectations: banks 
are required to maintain their level of monitoring in line with the prudential expectations. Supervisory expectations on 
secured exposures – that benefit from credit risk protection – apply after seven years from the date on which they have 
been classified non-performing (e.g. “vintage period”). Supervisory expectations on unsecured exposures – that do not 
benefit from credit risk protection – apply after two years from the date on which they have been defined as “vintage”. 
42 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards minimum loss coverage for nonperforming exposures, Brussels, 14 March 
2018, COM(2018) 134 final. 
43 Patrizia Baudino and Hyuncheol Yun, ‘Resolution of non-performing loans – policy options’, (2017), FSI Insights on 
policy implementation No. 3, 3-4, available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights3.pdf.   
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value.44 Avgouleas and Goodhart proposed a new structure for a Pan-European “bad bank” with 
virtually ringfenced country subsidiaries to ensure burden sharing without debt mutualisation.45 This 
proposal has been reinforced in the 2018 Commission blueprint on national AMC46: the document 
provides non-binding principles to guide Member States in the implementation of AMCs at the 
domestic level. These principles highlight the role of AMC in removing troubled assets from bank 
balance sheet and restructuring banks with high levels of NPLs. As stated, ‘AMCs can be private or 
(partly) publicly funded without State aid, if the State can be considered to act as any other economic 
agent’.47 It can be observed that the blueprint underlines the need to complement the AMCs with the 
State aid rules, the BRRD and the SRM regime to create a common level playing field for banks on 
NPLs resolving tools. 
 
5. The quest for public interest in rescuing failing banks 
In the case of MPS there has been a market dissemination of subordinated bonds to retail 
investors who were not presented with a full disclosure of potential risks.48 As result, the Italian 
government introduced a compensating scheme for affected retail investors whereby they would be 
able to convert the subordinated debt securities into equity.49 Even if such a political strategy might 
be desirable50, it can be considered as a circumvention to the applicability of bail-in on junior debt 
holders which according to the burden sharing principle applies when granting State aid. As Yadav 
noted, ‘Monte dei Paschi offers a cautionary example of what is at stake for regulators in seeking to 
                                                 
44 Andrea Enria, ‘The EU banking sector - risks and recovery. A single market perspective’, Luxembourg (2017), 16, 
available at https://www.esm.europa.eu/speeches-and-presentations/esm-seminar-andrea-enria-eba-chairperson. 
45 Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart, ‘Utilizing AMCs to tackle Eurozone’s legacy non performing loans’, 
(2017) European Economy Banks, Regulation, and the Real Sector, 103-104, available at http://european-
economy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/EE_1.2017.pdf.  
46 European Commission, ‘AMC Blueprint. Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Central Bank. Second Progress Report on 
the Reduction of Non-Performing Loans in Europe’, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, SWD(2018) 72 
final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/docs/policy/180314-staff-working-document-non-performing-
loans_en.pdf. 
47 Ibid, 4.  
48 European Commission, Press Release dated 1 June 2017 titled “Statement on an Agreement in principle between 
Commissioner Vestager and Italian authorities on Monte Dei Paschi di Siena (MPS)”.  
49 The financing to buy the equity from the original retail investors will be obtained from new secure senior debt 
instruments. The Commission understands that such compensation scheme is an entire separate consideration to burden 
sharing under the State aid framework. See European Commission, Press Release dated 1 June 2017 titled “Statement 
on an Agreement in principle between Commissioner Vestager and Italian authorities on Monte Dei Paschi di Siena 
(MPS)”. 
50 In this line of thinking Martin Sandbu, ‘Banking union will transform Europe’s politics’, Financial Times, 26 July 
2017, who observed that in the recent banking failures ‘Spain offered a glimpse into the future of bank regulation, while 
Italy clung to the bad habits of the past. On this discrepancy, Italy demonstrated greater ability to lobby for its case, 
however power is not all; it matters what one uses it for’. In particular, it is argued that banks in Italy are run by 
politically embedded foundations a scenario that show an incestuous relation between state and credit institutions. This 
phenomenon can determine the following effects: ‘deep confusion between the national interest and that of the banking 
sector; hidden subsidies from taxpayers to banks, protecting both their managers and their investors; and gross 
inefficiencies in an allocation of capital driven more by political and personal priorities than economic logic’. 
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solve the problem of too-big-to-fail banks. Post-crisis regulation requires banks to maintain thicker 
capital buffers-reserves of assets available to better ensure that banks can pay off depositors and 
other short-term creditors to prevent a crisis at one bad firm from spreading to others within the 
financial system’51. The ECB promoted the precautionary recapitalisation for MPS while it clearly 
stated in the guidelines on NPLs that the priority is to develop workout units and private debt 
restructuring agreements to write-off bad loans from the bank balance sheet.52 It seems that the ECB 
proposals to establish private mechanisms to resolve troubled banks ended up in forms of domestic 
bailout, reasonably the mandatory implementation of the NPL guidance into the complex system of 
banking resolution would have been desirable.  
As mentioned, the rules contained in the BRRD are largely flexible to allow Member States to 
adopt the policy measures necessary to protect the public interest, even if the directive does not 
define the boundaries of ‘public interest’ when to provide public support.53 The precautionary 
recapitalisation of MPS leaves doubts on the suitability of the public measure to restore the equity 
of the bank since it is not clear the interpretation of Article 32(4)(d) of the BRRD about the 
necessary aid. Specifically, the BRRD does not provide a clear definition of the ‘interest to preserve 
financial stability and remedy a serious disturbance in the economy’.54 In addition, it is not clear the 
distinction between precautionary recapitalisation and extraordinary public support since Article 32 
of the BRRD consider interchangeable these concepts, which in theory they should be regulated as 
different tools.55 Article 32(4) of the BRRD provides criteria for the failing or likely to fail 
(FOLTF) credit institutions and the concept of solvency should refer to these provisions.56 However 
the concepts of solvency and FOLFT do not coincide, raising doubts in the application of preventive 
measures to resolve distressed banks.57 It can be argued that the BRRD rules open room for 
interpretation of the applicable regime in a way that it could not be consistent with the public 
interest.  
                                                 
51 Yesha Yadav, ‘We Need to Know Who Invests in Bank Equity’ (2017) 70 Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc, 284. 
52 ECB (note 36) 19-20. 
53 Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone and Miriam Cassella, ‘Fine-tuning the use of bail-in to promote a stronger EU 
financial system’, CEPS Special Report No. 136, April 2016, 16-17. 
54 Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Costanza Russo, ‘Precautionary recapitalization: time for a review’, European 
Parliament, Note provided in advance of the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board in ECON on 
11 July 2017, 10. 
55 Christos V. Gortsos, ‘Last resort lending to solvent credit institutions in the euro area before and after the 
establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’, paper presented at the European Central Bank (ECB) 
Legal Conference: “From Monetary Union to Banking Union, on the way to Capital Markets Union: new opportunities 
for European integration” held in Frankfurt on 1-2 September 2015, 6, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688953. 
56 EBA Single Rulebook Q&A (2015_1777), available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa/-
/qna/view/publicId/2015_1777. 
57 World Bank-FinSAC, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: a Guidebook to the BRRD’, April 
2017, 106, available at http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/609571482207234996/FinSAC-BRRD-Guidebook.pdf. It is 
pointed out that ‘the FOLTF definition used under the BRRD is rather vague (and it will be difficult in practice to 
define the point of non-viability) but gives the required discretion to intervene early enough’. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, the introduction of new resolving 
mechanisms for distressed banks has been lauded as a significant step forward in the EU bank 
insolvency regime. In this context, the rapid rise of NPLs and the recent failures of fragile credit 
institutions have demonstrated the need to strengthen the harmonisation process of restructuring 
measures to avoid inconsistency in the application of rules and discretion of supervisory authorities. 
The EU Banking Union represents a welcome approach in the regulatory framework of ailing 
banks: the BRRD and the SRM establish innovative tools to avoid the involvement of depositors 
into the rescue programmes and to contain the disruptions of collapses. However the EU regulators 
leave wide discretion to national governments to adopt taxpayer funded bail-out which is a legacy 
of the past to protect financial stability under the public interest. 
